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Why a nineteenth-century study? 
 
The term ‘guerrilla’ tends to evoke twentieth-century rather than nineteenth-century 
connotations. The First World War witnessed insurgent challenges to imperial rule in 
Europe and Asia, guerrilla revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries in Latin America. 
The postwar era witnessed a brutalisation of counter-insurgency doctrines along with 
the brutalisation of politics, especially in China and the Soviet Union. The Second 
World War witnessed an intensification of counter-insurgency, especially at the hands 
of the exterminatory Japanese and German empires. The post-1945 era ushered in 
perhaps the most compex and diverse insurgency environment, as anti-colonial 
insurgencies were reinforced by communist, nationalistic and Maoist ideologies, which 
were countered with mixed success by metropolitan counter-insurgency strategies. 
‘People’s war’ thus conjured up images of Mao and Che Guevara, of revolutionary 
warfare, far removed from the supposedly state-centric armies and strategies of the 
nineteenth century. Even when the ideological certainties of the Cold War fell away 
from 1990, insurgencies diversified along civil war, religious and technological lines.1  
 
Yet insurgency is both the oldest form of warfare and the variety with the greatest 
opportunities for development. Insurgency, guerrilla, partisans, and ‘people’s war’ are 
nuances of the universal and immemorial phenomenon of irregular combatants waging 
war against formally constituted power. Military historians identify three types of 
‘people’s war’: guerrilla warfare, militia warfare, and conscription armies.2 The former 
two are analysed in this volume. Strategy expert, Beatrice Heuser, describes insurgent 
warfare as follows; ‘wars fought between parties that are fundamentally unequal, one 
side possessing authority, a recognised claim to a monopoly of power and a state 
apparatus in some form, often including armed forces’. 3  Recent research has 
demonstrated the diversity both of the guerrilla and of counter-insurgency throughout 
history. In the past three years the Small Wars and Insurgencies journal has published 
two special issues on the historical origins and contemporary impact of guerrilla 
warfare respectively.4 The nineteenth century offers particular opportunity for a fresh 
                                                 
1 Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents 
since 1750 (London, 2001).  
2 Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler (eds.), On the Road to Total War (Cambridge, 2002), p. 6. 
3 Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 387. 
4 Beatrice Heuser (ed.), Small Wars and Insurgencies in Theory and Practice, 1500-1850 (Routledge: 
Abingdon, 2015); Thomas A Marks and Paul B Rich, ‘Back to the Future: People’s War in the twenty-
first century’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 28, Iss. 3, 2017.  
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study of global insurgency and counter-insurgency. The military history of this century 
reveals much more than the symmetrical warfare of Napoleon, Grant and Moltke. It 
also reveals well-known and less well-known insurgencies, of links between guerrilla 
movements and nationalism, and of complex motivations and strategies driving both 
insurgencies and counter-insurgencies. Contemporary strategists were much more 
impressed by the burden and appeal of guerrilla warfare than a cursory glance at the 
military academies would reveal. Even the great exponent of interstate war, Carl von 
Clausewitz, had a complex understanding of guerrilla warfare that has often passed 
unremarked by scholars studying the post-Westphalian overtones in his On War.5  
 
Thus the nineteenth-century deserves a bespoke study, on a global scale. A global 
history of insurgency in this century presents us with a similar paradox as nineteenth-
century global history more widely. Global empires became more anatagonistic to each 
other even though their similarities, connections and linkages proliferated. Equally, 
patterns of insurgency and counter-insurgency showed increasing similarities to each 
other as the nineteenth century progressed, as the chapters in the following study 
demonstrate. Thus it is insufficient to view insurgency warfare only in a local, regional 
or even national context. Even such continental qualifiers as ‘European’ or ‘American’ 
history cannot provide a diverse understanding of insurgencies. Far-flung imperial 
warfare reverberated back onto the metropolis, just as metropolitan preconceptions 
conditioned counter-insurgency strategy. A global understanding of insurgency is all the 
more necessary considering how such factors as ecology, epidemiology, diasporas, and 
the ‘informal empire’ phenomenon of outsiders enjoying privileges over natives, all cut 
across regional, national and even continental divisions.6 And local, asymmetrical wars 
after the late eighteenth century tended to become ‘catastrophised’ by a new political 
climate in national and international affairs. 
 
This double special issue sheds new light on global insurgency and counter-insurgency 
in the nineteenth century. Bringing together both distinguished and rising scholars from 
Europe, North and South America, this issue provides new insights into an under-
researched topic. It exposes some insurgencies unknown to most scholars, explores the 
links between insurgencies and nationalism, and studies the extent to which we can 
identify evolving patterns between reactive and progressive insurgency, along with 
learning curves and emulation in counter-insurgency. 
 
A bespoke study of nineteenth-century asymmetric warfare presents us with many 
                                                 
5 Christopher Daase, ‘Clausewitz and Small Wars’ in Hew Strachan and Andreas Hergerg-Rothe (eds.), 
Clausewitz in the twenty-first century (Oxford, 2007), pp. 192-194. 
6 Bayly, Birth of the Modern World, pp. 1-3. 
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challenges. One of the features of modernity in the advanced polities of Europe and 
North America was what sociologist, Max Weber, called the monopoly on ‘legitimate’ 
violence owned by the state, as the ‘private’ violence related to serfdom and slavery 
disappeared. Administrative and judicial reforms, policing, and economic and 
demographic recovery, all set the trend for a reduction in the use of violence in internal 
affairs.7 The onset of European war in 1792 accelerated the growth of states on the one 
hand whilst producing wartime strains on the other hand which promoted the 
phenomenon of both insurgency and counter-insurgency. Moreover, irregular 
campaigns took place in a context in which political discourse to some extent 
exaggerated violence, driving a wedge between the ‘legitimate’ and often ideologically 
promoted violence of the forces of the state and the victimhood of ‘illegitimate’ 
violence of rebel communities.8  
 
The growing employment of state violence against ‘enemies’ rather than for internal 
law and order helped ‘totalise’ warfare, influencing ‘total war’ strategies and 
transforming the strategic landscape until the end of the Second World War. Thus what 
space is there for a study of war aims which in being asymmetrical, were also often 
limited rather than ‘total’? Even before the era of Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
warfare (and some fifty years before Clausewitz’s famous musings on the subject) the 
Comte de Guibert understood the differences between limited war and total war. The 
latter was made possible, Guibert thought, by the creation of mass citizens’ armies.9 
Another challenge lies in the growth of nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe, the 
continent which set the tone for most military evolution in this century and imbued a 
growing culture of militarism. Ascendant militarism between the end of the French 
Wars and the start of the First World War was reflected in most military strategists 
themselves being military officers, especially after the era of Moltke the Elder. Yet 
despite the growth of nationalism alongside militarism, these thinkers tended to read 
the works of thinkers in other countries.10 Military strategists thought globally, and this 
is reflected in the global reach of this volume.  
 
These nineteenth-century strategists grew ever more aggressive in their calculations. 
Unlike eighteenth-century strategists, who could not reach consensus about whether 
offensive or defensive war was stronger (both seemed to have their role), nineteenth-
century strategists were more offensively minded. Napoleon and his legacy up to 1914 
witnessed strategists almost universally believing in the ‘cult of the offensive’. Even 
                                                 
7 Mark Hewitson, Absolute War (2017), p. 129. 
8 David Bell makes this case in a forthright manner (Bell, First Total War). 
9 Heuser, Strategy before Clausewitz (London, 2017), pp. 167-72. 
10 Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy (2010), p. 120. 
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the small wars expert, Callwell, judged pre-emptive offensives by regular forces to be 
the best war-winning tactic.11 The advancing abilities of states to mobilise troops and 
(especially from from mid-century) implement new weapons and logistical technology 
led Western strategists to privilege recent historical lessons. Neither Jomini (1779-
1869), Clausewitz (1780-1831) nor Auguste de Marmont (1774-1852) spent significant 
time learning the lessons of ancient warfare, focusing instead on Frederick the Great 
and, especially, Napoleon, as the godfathers of military modernity. The nineteenth 
century thus produced an era in lessons from living memory, even if thinkers (especially 
Jomini) proved slow at making sense of the technological revolution in warfare evident 
from the mid-nineteenth century.12  
 
As the nineteenth century progressed, military thinkers grew ever more convinced that 
the coming war would be a war of mass and movement. Attention to guerrilla warfare 
could not keep up with military revolution, even though the 1815-1914 era actually 
witnessed relatively few major wars and relatively many guerrilla wars. Even such 
classically symmetrical wars as the American Civil War and Franco-Prussian War 
involved partisan operations, and these were of a different order to the ‘partisans’ 
attached to regular armies as scouts before the Napoleonic Wars. Before 1810 irregular 
warfare was considered the preserve of special forces (‘partisans’, or ‘parties’) 
operating behind enemy lines in support of regular forces. Yet 1810 witnessed the leap 
from ‘partisan war’ to ‘people’s war’, owing to the ironic emulation of the French 
Revolutionary example in both Patriot Spain and Prussia.13 Sibylle Scheipers suggests 
that ‘the irregular initially emerged from the state, and not in opposition to the state,’ 
but by the time of the Napoleonic wars irregular forces would be seen as ‘an intolerable 
challenge to the ‘norm’ of regular warfare’.14 The legitimate monopoly on violence 
owned by the forces of the state was now threatened in ways which reached far beyond 
the military impact of insurgency. In the words of the counterinsurgent theorist, David 
Galula, ‘the insurgent needs so little to achieve so much whereas the counterinsurgent 
needs so much to achieve so little’.15 The nineteenth-century, thanks to the of the 
French and Napoleonic Wars, recast insurgencies as threats to the state, not as an 
adjunct to state power as during the Early Modern era. Thus irregular forces would, in 
the words of Sibylle Scheipers, pose ‘an intolerable challenge to the ‘norm’ of regular 
warfare’.16 The theme of the following articles comprises the conflict of ‘anti-state’ 
forces waging war against formally constituted power.  
                                                 
11 Beatrice Heuser, Evolution of Strategy (2010), pp. 146-152. 
12 Heuser, Strategy before Clausewitz (2017), pp. 62-63. 
13 Heuser, Strategy before Clausewitz (2017), pp. 187-188. 
14 Sibylle Scheipers, Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter, pp.33-34 
15 Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy, p. 389.   





The legacy of legitimate state violence, combined with army honour codes, did not 
commend irregular warfare for study. Despite persistent guerrilla struggles, there was a 
repeated refusal of major armies to recognise guerrilla warfare as ‘real’ war. Academy-
trained officers viewed guerrilla fighters as rebels and bandits, which was completely 
at odds with the romanticisation of such supposedly popular struggles as the Spanish 
and Russian ‘people’ against Napoleon. Nineteenth-century Europe witnessed a marked 
acceleration in ruthlessness as a consequence of the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars. The French response to irregular resistance was in many cases brutal 
and oppressive, utilising ‘flying columns’ developed during the insurrection in the 
Vendée to mount reprisal attacks against villages thought to be collaborating with 
guerrillas. The French branded the irregulars universally as ‘brigands’ in order to strip 
the guerrillas of their political legitimacy, And, since ‘brigands’ did not have any 
political legitimacy, but were fuelled by criminal motives, the customs of war did not 
apply to them. Hence, the French forces were allowed to shoot them without 
trial.17  Scheipers argues that the revolutionary state’s harsh response to these early 
risings ‘helped shape the emergence of the concept of the ‘brigand’ as the predominant 
label for the irregular fighters.18 
 
For what the counterinsurgency condemned as brigandage the insurgency celebrated as 
heroism. Robin Hood loomed large as a template to bestow upon nineteenth-century 
guerrillas a mystique. Su Sanniang, female Robin-Hood-style gangleader of the Taiping 
rebellion, acted initially to avenge the death of her husband but soon became a 
charismatic leader in her own right. 19  Even as the romanticised insurgent of the 
nineteenth century evolved into the ideological freedom-fighter of the twentieth, 
military academies remained remarkably unreflective. In the extreme case of the USA, 
only conventional and intensive warfare was seen as ‘worthy’ of study and doctrine. As 
one US general remarked in 1970 regarding the US military’s failed strategy in Vietnam: 
“I’ll be damned if I permit the US army, its institutions, its doctrine and its traditions, 
to be destroyed just to win this lousy war”.20 US officer academies today will generally 
not engage with military history before the Second World War, because US military 
doctrine is so wedded to the centrality of technology. 21  There was an appealing 
                                                 
17 Sibylle Scheipers, Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter, p. 61. 
18 Sibylle Scheipers, Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter, p. 54. 
19 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 93-98. 
20 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies, pp. 24-27. 
21 Black, Rethinking Military History (2004), p. 6. 
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‘Whiggishness’ to this obsession with military modernity. Whereas Early Modern and 
Modern European ‘state-building’ wars had many positive side-effects (extension of 
state machine/protection, enhanced popular participation in the state, technological 
innovations), the twentieth-century era of ‘privatised’ wars, especially those after 1945, 
were only destructive (not even productive economically given the reliance often on 
imported weapons).22 There was little emotional appeal to engage with factional and 
intra-state wars from a purely military perspective. 
 
Such intransigence is remarkable considering that the USA like other Western powers 
developed counter-insurgency experience over the course of the nineteenth century. The 
American Civil War, the subject of Susan-Mary Grant’s contribution to this special 
issue, resulted in US military law for the first time codifying the treatment of captured 
partisans. Women and children were usually spared direct reprisals by both 
Confederates and Unionists during the American Civil War –as long as they were white 
(not black or Indian) – captured irregulars were frequently submitted to summary 
justice. Even though the Lieber Code stipulated that even captured partisans were 
entitled to military trial, in several campaigns Union commanders, often in reprisal for 
Confederate ruthlessness, ordered summary shootings of irregulars. 23  Nor did US 
counterinsurgency experience end there. During the awkward task of cutting off civilian 
support for enemy insurgents, the US armed forces matched other Great Powers in 
adopting ‘reconcentration’ tactics, such as in post-Spanish Cuba and post-Spanish 
Philippines. Similar tactics had been employed by the Spanish themselves, who during 
their last colonial counterinsurgency in Cuba during 1895-98 reconcentrated civilians 
in the loyalist west of the island, often in response to the ‘deconcentration’ strategy of 
the Cuban Liberation Army. 24  The British turned the chaotic Spanish 
counterinsurgency model into a ‘camp’ system, less bloody than the Spanish-Cuban 
precedent but appalling (and well publicised) all the same. Blockhouses and wire 
intercepted Boer guerrillas while civilian support for the insurgency was curtailed by 
the forced relocation of civilians into ‘concentration camps’. The Americans in the 
Philippines used similar ruthlessness, albeit matched with a ‘civic action’ programme 
(of using the presence of military bases to ‘civilise’ relocated populations). The French 
in Morocco under General Lyautey had their own version of ‘civic action’ called the 
‘oil slick’ strategy.25  
 
                                                 
22 Herfried Muenkler, ‘Clausewitz and the Privatisation of War’ in Hew Strachan and Andreas 
Hergerg-Rothe (eds.), Clausewitz in the twenty-first century (Oxford, 2007), pp. 226-227. 
23 Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents 
since 1750 (London, 2001), pp. 30-31.  
24 John Lawrence Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898 (North Carolina, 2006), pp. 54-58. 
25 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies, pp. 30-41. 
 7 
National traditions of counterinsurgency had clearly emerged by the end of the 
nineteenth century. Yet as this volume shows, these traditions were not hermetic. 
Strategists read beyond their national literatures and the counterinsurgency strategy of 
nations actually overlapped with and informed each other. The Belgian-officered Force 
Públique in the Congo Free State, as Mario Draper explains, borrowed strategy from 
French and British precedents during its 1892-94 Congo-Arab War. Little-known 
Belgian concepts of counter-insurgency appealed to universal – and flexible – laws of 
war as much as such better-known theorists as Callwell and Lyautey. Alexander 
Morrison’s study explains how Callwell’s cultural preconceptions limited his 
understanding of Russian counter-insurgency operations in Central Asia. His 
information was second-hand and he was all too inclined to support interpretations 
which matched his own model. On the one hand Callwell was recognisable in a 
Victorian sense in underestimating the sophistication of Russia’s ‘savage’ enemies, in 
their fortress systems, for example, even equating the conquest of unyielding natural 
terrain with an unyielding ‘character’ of non-European opposition. On the other hand 
he was refreshingly matter-of-fact in his acceptance of atrocities and killings of civilians, 
and did not stand upon this as a faux moral issues by which inaccurately to distinguish 
Russian imperialism from British: indeed Callwell’s coverage of Russian actions in 
Central Asia understood the ‘Great Game’ to be militarily complementary.    
 
Mobility and pursuit 
 
Despite the absence of railways in Europe and the USA for much of the nineteenth 
century, and even longer in the cases of Latin America, Africa and China, regular armies 
accelerated their mobility. The advent of the French levée en masse, perfected by 
Napoleon, led to greater mobility of armies in Europe. Napoleon prided himself on his 
mobility: marching fast and divided on multiple roads certainly eased the efficiency 
with which the French lived off the land.26 One of the paradoxes of the creeping 
modernisation caused by railways, factories and more sophisticated weaponry, was that 
it led to mass armies and less mobility than during the pre-twentieth century times of 
rapid movement on threadbare logistics and living off the land. Martin van Creveld 
argued that Europe’s Western Front from 1915 ushered in a new era of static wafare, 
which persisted amidst the mass armies of the Second World War, and the logistically 
complex successive generations of weapons technology since the Cold War.27 Thus our 
period of study in many ways represented a high point in regular armies’ mobility. As 
a consequence nineteenth-century proved at their most successful when operating in 
                                                 
26 Esdaile, Wars of Napoleon, pp. 41-42. 
27 Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977) pp. 17-26. 
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coordination with regular forces.28    
 
Accelerated mobility led to the overhaul of ‘cabinet warfare’ norms by regular armies 
on the one hand, and their revitalisation by insurgents on the other. In Europe the French 
Revolutionary abandonment of fortifications as centres of supplies propelled more 
living off the land.29 But fortifications retained their importance as bases for insurgents 
throughout the nineteenth century, in Iberia, southern Italy, the Tyrol, Central Asia, 
China and Mexico. Yingcong Dai’s study of the White Lotus rebellion shows how 
mountaintop forts were refuges both for insurgents and civilans trying to stay out of 
harm’s way. Fortified topography also featured in irregular warfare in Mexico, Spain, 
Portugal, and Central Asia, as the articles by Nathaniel Morris, Mark Lawrence, Charles 
Esdaile and Alexander Morrison respectively show.  
 
As for nineteenth-century irregular warfare, mobility was more mixed. In most 
instances insurgents continued the patterns of high mobility within local regions only. 
Natalia Sobrevilla and Alejandro Rabinovich show how ‘intermittent’ mobilisation by 
local volunteers in South America tended to be militarily superior to the ‘permanent’ 
mobilisation of the indoctrinated and expedited levies of the state. Localism is also a 
feature of Charles Esdaile’s study of Portugal’s locally-organised militia (ordenança) 
which proved effective in harassing and ambushing longer-ranged French invasion 
forces. ‘Intermittent’ and militia forces, according to Archer Jones, pursued one side of 
the coin of western strategy since ancient times: ‘raiding’. Raiders were unable to 
occupy territory or populations for extended periods of time. Instead ‘persistent’ forces 
faced this task, including in counter-insurgency campaigns.30 Mark Lawrence’s study 
of the Carlist insurgency of the 1830s shows how raiding was dictated by longer-term 
political as well as shorter-term military considerations. Population centres deemed 
‘Carlist’ were ‘liberated’ by raids and treated with a view to shoring up political support, 
whereas hostile populations were pillaged for short-term military benefit. 
 
Raiders, militia and ‘intermittent’ soldiers usually resented the growing claims of states 
to impose militarisation. Giacomo Macola’s and Luke Hogan’s study shows how pre-
colonial African politics were undergoing militarisation in traditional ways. The 
Katanga region witnessed hit-and-run tactics, and static and siege warfare fuelled by 
the Sanga insurgenct enjoying local knowledge of terrain and support networks. 
                                                 
28 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency : Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge, 2013), 
p. 13 ; Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 50-52. 
29 Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy (Cambridge, 2010), p. 80. 
30 Archer Jones, The art of war in the western world (Urbana and Champaign: University of Illinois 
Press, 2001), pp.662–716. 
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Warlords (garenganze) were all-important, and not all were able to survive European 
penetration in the late century. The Yeke tribe survived thanks to their core of armed 
gunmen, and became agents of the Congo Free State, whilst the Sanga were eventually 
crushed. The prospects for tribal autonomy under European conquest were thus partly 
dictated by pre-contact factors. 
 
Even sophisticated imperial societies offering advanced constitutional and legal 
safeguards were prone to draconian policing, albeit seldom on the scale witnessed 
during the French Revolution, mid-century China, or colonial Africa. Nineteenth-
century Ireland produced a recurrent insurgent nationalism, stemming from its 
subordinate position to London, the grudging emancipation of the island’s majority 
Catholic population, and the subsequent inability for any elite in Dublin to cut across 
political divisions by appealing to the ‘constitution’, as elites in neigbouring Great 
Britain often did with success.31 After 1800, despite being formally integrated into a 
'United' Kingdom and the British composite monarchy, Ireland was ruled by a series of 
special rules with colonial overtones of counterinsurgency. As Tim Bowman argues in 
this volume, the Irish Constabulary, whose origins dated back to 1822, was much more 
of a continental-style gendarmerie than the 'servant of the citizen' local police beloved 
of Great Britain; indeed, only the Dublin Metropolitan Police operated in conditions 
deemed 'safe’ enough to be routinely unarmed on the classic British model. Yet the 
Constabulary's varied civic duties and uneven distribution seldom gave them the 
appearance of a colonial occupation force except in moments of insurgency crisis, such 
as 1848 and 1867. Even though the Ribbonmen and Fenian insurgencies of 1848 and 
1867 paled in significance to the mass risings of 1798 and 1916, Bowman's study 
uncovers the anxieties of the Protestant Ascendancy. The threat of Fenian infiltration 
into the substantial Irish elements in the British Army, along with the Irish militia, 
dominated the security concerns of the Dublin Castle administration and led to a series 
of projected countermeasures (such as there demolition of houses close to Dublin 
Castle, plans to use infrastructure to link isolated police 'barracks' in there countryside, 
and the creation of flying columns besides). 
 
As the century progressed metropolitan public opinion became a factor in opposition to 
colonial powers applying brutalised counter-insurgency. Ian Beckett’s study shows how 
British counterinsurgency efforts in the 1880s Third Burma War were dictated by 
topographical and climate challenges, notions of collaborating hill tribes like the Karen 
being ‘martial races’, and a concern that the excessive imbalance in casualties in the 
                                                 
31 Ultán Gillen, ‘Ascendancy Ireland, 1660-1800’, Richard Bourke and Ian McBride (eds.), The 
Princeton History of Modern Ireland (Princeton University Press, 2016), pp. 48-73. 
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British favour be kept secret from the press as much as possible. Beckett also shows 
how villagers found themselves between two fires: rapacious bandits (dacoits) and 
foreign imperialists in equal measure, but that part of the British success was in 
convincing many villagers that less pillage and more protection was to be found at 
British hands. The British used flying columns like in the Vendee, and a similar 
incremental garrisoning of villages. Despite the significant effort and casualties 
expanded, the campaign of the ‘lost footsteps’ never got appropriate recognition. 
 
Equally, irregular resistance to Russian conquest in Central Asia, as well as British 
expansion in Burma, was manifest in highly mobile but also highly localised armed 
groups, as Alexander Morrison’s and Ian Becket’s articles show. But whereas the 
French, British and Russians counterinsurgencies tended to offer cohesive fronts, other 
armies were more fragmented, increasing the appeal of longer-range operations for 
insurgents. Nathaniel Morris shows how Manuel Lozada’s long-standing campaign 
against the Mexican state ranged across several states. Mark Lawrence shows how 
Carlists in the 1830s exploited the internal political disintegration of a nominally more 
powerful Spanish state by launching expeditions across Spain in 1836 and 1837. Most 
strikingly, the White Lotus insurgents at the turn of the century performed long-range 
marches from Hubei which eerily anticipated Mao’s ideologically very different ‘Long 
March’ of the 1930s.      
 
Episodes such as those of Poland in 1793, 1831 and 1863, as well as the struggle of the 
Garibaldini, demonstrated the hybrid nature of guerrilla warfare and the growing 
tendency of insurgents to militarise themselves formally. 32  The French call for a 
‘chouan’ people’s war during the Franco-Prussian War after Sedan showed the limits of 
irregular war in the age of the revolution in military affairs. Small tactical successes 
aside, the war was only indirectly impacted by French partisans, and civilians proved 
lukewarm to support such a struggle. For a long time, episodes of brutality by the 
occupying Prussian-led armies in France led historians to discern a peculiarly German 
preponderance for atrocity which linked the Franco-Prussian War, to exterminatory 
colonial policing in Germany’s African colonies, to the ‘Rape of Belgium’ in 1914, and 
ultimately to the unprecedented horrors of the Nazi empire in Europe.33 But Matteo 
Scianna in this volume reappraises this view with his study of German counter-
insurgency during the Franco-Prussian War. Scianna shows that German responses to 
real and imagined francs-tireurs were not exceptional. Combat stresses would have led 
to outrages being committed by any army, and given that soldiers found guilty of 
                                                 
32 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 65-69. 
33 E.g. Isabel Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and Practices of War in Imperial Germany 
(Cornell, 2005); Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 83-88. 
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committing atrocities were consitently subjected to courts martial.   
Scianna shows how ideological perceptions linking the levée en masse with civilian 
resistance in 1871 distorted what was a ‘normal’ symmetrical war. Equally twentieth-
century perceptions of Geman brutality retrospectively shaped understanding of 
Prussia’s nineteenth-century militarism. A more sympathetic view of Prussian history 
has emerged only recently.34 Prussia after 1945 was remembered as the villain, its 
progressive heritage being selectively forgotten. Patterns of how wars were 
remembered, and equally how and why they were forgotten, form a major theme in this 
volume. In some instances they are of a largely operational nature, such as Charles 
Esdaile’s article explaining the failure of the Napoleonic empire to learn the lessons of 
the 1762 ‘Guerra Fantástica’ in relation to Portugal’s fierce topography, fortresses and 
capacity for guerrilla warfare.  
In other instances they help to address enduring misconceptions about the role played 
by military history in national identity. Late-imperial China has usually been viewed as 
an ‘amilitary’ or ‘demilitarised’ culture, largely as a consequence of centuries of 
Confucianism leading to an inward-looking, bureaucratic dynasty which proved all the 
more vulnerable to Western military encroachments. This view has now been revised.35 
The aticles by Yingcong Dai and Kenneth Swope, on insurgency and counter-
insurgency respectively in the Ching dynasty, revise the old orthodoxy further, 
complicating and enhancing our understanding in the studies of ‘White Lotus’ 
insurgency and General Zuo’s counter-insurgency. Kenneth Swope’s study places 
counterinsurgency at the heart of the Xing dynasty’s survival during the internal and 
external threats of the mid-nineteenth century. In a different vein of remembering and 
forgetting, Richard Reid’s article explains how post-independence African elites, 
themselves forged by anti-colonial guerrilla struggles, proved to be selective about how 
they remembered nineteenth-century pre-colonial warfare. As Africans’ resistance to 
the European ‘Scramble’ for their continent offered the Africans little military glory, 
post-independent states preferred to remember anti-colonial independence struggles of 
the twentieth century. Pre-colonial insurgencies, by contrast, were selectively 
remembered, usually with twentieth-century calculations in mind. Reid’s study of 
Uganda explains the thriving pre-nineteenth century traditions of African kingdoms 
expanding and centralising the power of kingdoms via tightened control of professional 
armies. Mirambo (Miyela Kasanda, 1840-1884), a military genius who militarised the 
Nyamwezi tribe, was selectively remembered by twentieth-century African leaders, 
                                                 
34 Especially, Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: the Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 
(London, 2007). 
35 E.g. Nicola di Cosmo (ed.), Military Culture in Imperial China (Harvard, 2009), pp. 1-22. 
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including by Idi Amin who needed to discover legitimacy in pre-colonial African 
militarism as a figleaf legitimising his own coup.  
Towards total warfare 
 
This nineteenth century, at least from a Western perspective, lies at the heart of a period 
in history in which strategies for waging war became ‘total’. From a strategic 
perspective, 1945 marked the end of an era since the French Revolution during which 
military strategy was dominated by the desire to seek the unconditional surrender of the 
enemy (and often of his political institutions). Such aims had proved to be high stakes 
indeed whenever ‘hearts and minds’ did not accept regime change. At the same time, 
even though post-1945 strategy fundamentally shifted towards limited war once more 
(given the mushroom-shaped cloud), there was a growing realisation that the absence 
of war did not necessarily mean peace. The Cold War prospect of nuclear Armageddon 
made warring parties more likely to settle for less than the all-out imposition of their 
will in the Clausewitzian sense, meaning that post-1945 history has witnessed the 
logical resurrection of ‘limited war’ strategies.36 
 
The development of the rifle, and its ability to be mass-produced and disseminated 
throughout the armies, resulted in giant change in tactics. The increase in rate of fire, 
range, and accuracy meant that the rifle eclipsed the artillery as the monster on the 
battlefield, and that battlefield was deadlier than it ever had been before – as a result, 
the way troops moved and organised themselves underwent a gradual but substantial 
change. It became more and more fruitless and devastating to attempt a frontal assault 
against such firepower, and so armies began to abandon the traditional massed frontal 
attacks in favour of flanking manoeuvres, and mostly abandoned the bayonet in reaction 
to the increased range of combat.37 Simultaneously, the new lethality meant that the 
way troops attacked had to be altered: the eighteenth-century organisation of massed 
regiments of men became inadequate, and a new system of advance had to be created. 
Troops began to disperse into skirmishing lines instead of standing shoulder-to-shoulder, 
and resultantly the system of volley fire was abandoned; smaller units were created and 
instead a new system of fire and manoeuvre was invented by Moltke during the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870- every tactical group was to ever remain on the offensive, and to 
attack, manoeuvre, and pause under cover of fire from another unit.38 Simultaneously, 
fighting standing erect was abandoned and earth- or stone- works were increasingly 
introduced after the American Civil War, most used at the very end of the century. 
                                                 
36 Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy (2010), pp. 17-26. 
37 Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961, Da Capo Press, Brunswick, 1992, p. 104 
38 Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961, p. 120 
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Concealment was another way of surviving, and the fashionable old, bright uniforms 
were gradually replaced in favour of duller, disguising colours like feldgrau, khaki, and 
horizon blue. Steel protective helmets were also beginning to be introduced; grand 
gestures after centuries where war was a spectacle and uniforms were bold and eye-
catching. The introduction of smokeless powder near the end of the century favoured 
skirmishing lines instead of the columns of the 18th century. The ability of a man to hide 
himself behind an earthwork meant that troops could extend themselves in even longer 
lines than before and still project an appearance of defensive strength – meaning that 
the concentration of men per metre dropped from 1 every 10 metres in the 18th down 
to 1 every 25 in the American Civil War and 1 in 250 metres in the Great War.39  
 
The mid-century counter-insurgencies addressed in this volume witnessed accelerated 
innovation in weapons and logistical technology, especially in the case of the American 
Civil War and Franco-Prussian War. Total war was accompanied by total poltical 
strategies, as the price of defeat – such as the abolition of slavery in the Confederacy – 
promised to overturn the social order. Yet even ‘total’ wars were experienced in an 
ameotional manner recognisable to veterans of pre-industrial wars. Susan-Mary Grant’s 
study of a future Supreme Court Justice’s (Oliver Wendell Holmes) experiences 
fighting against the Confederacy applies the concepts of morale and emotion developed 
in John Keegan’s seminar Face of Battle. Grant makes the case for an ‘emotional 
revolution’ in relation to counter-insurgent warfare, as Holmes’s experiences fighting 
are a coming-of-age progression from boyhood to manhood, from civilian to military. 
Studying Holmes’ campaign letters, Grant reveals his emotional strain, his jadededness 
with the progressive Unionist ideas over the course of campaigning, and ultimately how 
the experience of fighting insurgents forged in Holmes a new identity of a ‘warrior’, 
which never left him even as he progressed in a distinguished career later in life.    
 
Given the relentless modernisation of symmetrical warfare, the role of the insurgent 
seemed to be increasingly outdated. Given that nineteenth-century insurgencies tended 
to be very much reactions to revolutions rather than the reverse, it is unsurprising that 
Engels, Marx, Lenin and Trotsky downplayed guerrilla warfare. That said, from the 
mid-nineteenth-century there were some thinkers in Poland and Italy who identified a 
link between guerrilla warfare and revolutions (Mazzini being the most distinguished). 
The Mazzinian model of achieving democratic revolution via guerrilla warfare became 
more radicalised by the later part of the century. From the 1880s, the revolutionary 
German Socialist (SPD), Johann Most, coined the term ‘propaganda by deed’.40 But 
                                                 
39 Creveld, Technology and War, The Free Press, New York, 1991, p. 172 
40 Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies, pp. 14-15. 
 14 
there were some dissenters. Jean de Bloch at the end of the nineteenth century was one 
such figure whose War of the Future argued that the individualistic potential, range and 
precision of the rifle made guerrilla war the war of the future instead of close-order 
infantry combat.  
 
But an abiding model of nineteenth-century guerrilla is the civil war revolt against 
modernity. Arguably, reactionary and religious-inspired guerrilla movements in the 
nineteenth century were most likely to start in response to sudden political change, as 
the 1833 onset of the First Carlist War (the subject of Mark Lawrence’s article) and the 
1890s Canudo revolt in Brazil showed. Carlists and Canudos were anti-liberal and anti-
republican respectively, and their revolts had religious overtones. A second model is 
liberationist and anti-colonial, such as in Latin America during 1810-1824, Haiti, 1860s 
Mexico, Cuban independence revolts in the 1868-78 and 1895-98 periods, and also 
Garibaldi’s Italy and Poland. A third model is in response to new colonial campaigns 
penetrating from the outside, such as Shamil’s famous resistance ot Russian 
campaigning in the Caucasus, Maori Land Wars, Native Americans in the US frontier 
wars, Zulus, Boers, and resistance to Dutch expansion in Sumatra and French expansion 
in North Africa, Madagascar, Tonkin, and that of the USA in the Philippines.41 But for 
most of the nineteenth century huge areas of Africa were immune to European conquest. 
Just as in Asia in the Early Modern Era whites at African ports were seen as traders 
looking to barter, not posing much of a military threat to Muslim and Animist empires 
throughout the continent. 42  Even amidst the late-nineteenth-century ‘Scramble’ 
African insurgencies were conditioned for reasons which had very little to do with 
encroaching European imperialism, as the article by Giacomo Macola and Jack Hogan 
attests.  
 
Thus this volume views nineteenth-century insurgency and counter-insurgency on a 
global scale. It shows the commonalities of responses more than their differences, and 
refracts these through themes which crop up repeatedly in different times places. These 
themes include common problems and common solutions; the challenge of 
commanding local intelligence networks; public opinion; millenarianism, magic and 
religion; technology; ‘hearts and minds’; the legal framework of state violence; racial 
stereotypes; and patterns of forgetting and remembering guerrilla conflicts.  
 
                                                 
41 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 53-99. 
42 Bruce Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914 (Routledge, 1998), pp. 26-27. 
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